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C ONCLU SION ...........................................................
This Article sets out a theory of torts and cyberspace wrongs. My goal is to
provide a sparse theoretical account of tort law and apply it to cyberspace
torts, both negligent and intentional. I approach this goal by applying the
framework of property rules and liability rules to cyberspace torts. That
framework suggests that trespassdoctrine is appropriatein instances of cyberinvasions of private information resources, such as the breaking of codes to
access private information on the web. However, trespass doctrine should
play no role in cyber-invasions of public information resources, such as the
sending of spam email. I also examine indirect liability claims against
operatingsystem sellers or Internet Service Providersfor the harms caused by
cyberspace actors (e.g., virus writers, copyright violators). The theory
* Professor of Law, Boston University, knhylton@bu.edu. For helpful comments I thank
workshop participants at Copenhagen Business School, especially Henrik Lando. I thank
Nicola Leiter and Dena Milligan for research assistance. This research was supported by
Boston University and Microsoft. The views expressed, as well as errors and omissions, are
entirely my own.
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presented here suggests that the basis for strict indirect liability is weak.
Finally, the theory suggests that immunity rules shouldplay a role in this area,
though in a smaller set of instances than those protected by the
Communications Decency Act.
INTRODUCTION

Legislative proposals to usher in an era of "electronic medicine" have
helped identify as a puzzle the failure of the medical industry to keep up with
information technology.' Many have noted that financial records and credit
histories are contained in electronic libraries, while medical records are still
stored in manila folders. 2 Perhaps one reason for this is the number of things
that can go wrong with information technology or, more simply, software.
Consider just a few examples of the things that could go wrong with
software in the medical industry. Suppose a company introduces a cardiac
defibrillator (a machine that emits an electric jolt to correct an irregular
heartbeat) that is surgically inserted into the patient's body and uses a software
program to govern itself, as well as to allow physicians to monitor its activity.
Consider the consequences when a defect in the software causes the electric
impulses to fire when they should not or fail to fire when they should.
As a second example, suppose medical patient records are stored in an
electronic library. A hacker gets access to the library and alters the records.
Third, suppose a hacker releases a "spider" that crawls through medical
records and forwards the information to others or makes it publicly available.
Or, returning to the defibrillator example, suppose the hacker finds a way to
control the functioning of the defibrillator. It is easy to see that the harms that
might result from defective or insecure software in the medical setting could be
significantly greater than those observed in the more common settings
involving financial records. Fear of the potential harm and resultant liability
could be a major reason technology companies have not rushed into the
electronic medicine market.
Electronic medicine is just one of many examples in ordinary life where
software flaws can lead to serious harms and subsequent liability. We have
already seen computer viruses cause enormous damage to property and to
commercial transactions. 3 And each of us by now is familiar with the problem
of "spain" electronic mail and the burdens it imposes.
For an example of a recent legislative proposal to introduce electronic medicine, see
Health Technology To Enhance Quality Act of 2005, S. 1262, 109th Cong. (2005). For a
description of the bill, see Press Release, Office of N.Y. Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Frist,
Clinton Introduce Health Technology To Enhance Quality Act of 2005 (June 16, 2005),
availableat http://www.senate.gov/-clinton/news/statements/details.cfm?id=239875.
2 See, e.g., Special Report: IT in the Health-CareIndustry, ECONOMIST, Apr. 30, 2005, at

65, 65.
3 See Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Law and Economics of Software
Security 17-21 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 06-08,
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This Article attempts to set out a general theory of torts and cyberspace
wrongs. It differs from the previous literature in this area by avoiding the
piecemeal approach taken in most articles. 4 The goal here is to start with a
theoretical account of tort law and to apply that to cyberspace torts, both
negligent and intentional. I approach this goal by applying the framework of
property rules and liability rules to cyberspace torts. That framework suggests
that trespass doctrine is appropriate in instances of cyber-invasions of private
information resources, such as the breaking of codes to access private
information on the web. However, trespass doctrine should play no role in
instances of cyber-invasions of public information resources, such as the
sending of spain email. Another set of cases I examine are those in which
plaintiffs assert indirect liability claims against operating system sellers,
Interet Service Providers, or software developers for the harms caused by
third-party cyberspace actors (e.g., virus writers, copyright violators). The
theory presented here suggests that the basis for strict indirect liability is weak.
Finally, the theory suggests that immunity rules should play a role in this area,
though in a much smaller set of instances than in existing law.
I.

A FEW

EXAMPLES

To get a clearer sense of the problems that arise in this area, I will start by
describing a few of the better-known cases at the intersection of torts and
cyberspace. Of course, information technology is constantly evolving, so a
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=897725 (discussing the results of a survey
conducted by the Computer Security Institute on the economic impact of software security
breaches).
I I do not intend the description "piecemeal" as pejorative. I am simply referring to the
tendency in the literature to focus on one particular type of cyberspace tort theory, such as
trespass or nuisance. For examples of excellent articles that are in the piecemeal tradition,
see generally Richard A. Epstein, Cybertrespass,70 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (2003), and Adam
Mossoff, Span - Oy, What a Nuisance!, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 625 (2004). There are
also articles that have taken a more general approach to determining the appropriate legal
regime. Most of these articles focus on the appropriate analogy or metaphor for thinking
about torts in cyberspace. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL &
EMERGING Bus. L. 27 (2000); Richard A. Epstein, Intel v. Hamidi: The Role of Self-Help in
Cyberspace?, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 147 (2005); Dan Hunter, Cyberspaceas Place and the
Tragedy of the DigitalAnticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439 (2003); Mark A. Lemley, Place
and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REV. 521 (2003); David McGowan, The Trespass Trouble and
the Metaphor Muddle, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 109 (2005); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Property
Rights and Competition on the Internet: In Search of an AppropriateAnalogy, 16 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 561 (2001); Jonathan J. Rusch, Cyberspace and the "Devil's Hatband," 24
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 577 (2000); Alfred C. Yen, Western Frontier or Feudal Society?:
Metaphors and Perceptions of Cyberspace, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1207 (2002). See
generally Symposium, Property Rights on the Frontier: The Economics of Self-Help and
Self-Defense in Cyberspace, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 1 (2005). The present Article differs
from this literature in the sense that it sets up a general framework for tort law and shows
that it applies to cyberspace wrongs.
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description of previous cases may not tell us much about the problems that will
arise in the future. Still, the previous cases have set out several issues that
courts continue to grapple with in their efforts to apply tort law to a new realm.
In Blumenthal v. Drudge,5 Matt Drudge reported in his column disseminated
by America Online that Clinton White House aide Sidney Blumenthal had
physically abused his wife in the past. 6 Blumenthal filed a defamation suit
against Drudge and America Online. At the time of the suit, America Online
paid Drudge $3000 per month to write the column and exercised certain
editorial rights over its content, including the right to demand changes and to
remove it. 7 Still, the court found that America Online was entitled to immunity
under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.8 The trial judge noted
that if he were "writing on a clean slate," he would have held America Online
liable in accordance with the legal standards applied to ordinary publishers. 9
In Intel Corp. v. Hamidi,'0 the plaintiff Intel Corporation maintained an
email system accessible by the Intemet.ll A former employee of Intel sent
thousands of emails (up to 35,000 at a time) to Intel employees, criticizing the
company's employment practices.' 2 Intel filed suit, claiming that the emails,
distributed without the company's consent, constituted trespass to chattels. 3
Reversing an injunction issued by the lower court, the California Supreme
Court held that in order to prevail on a trespass-to-chattels theory the plaintiff
had to prove some actual injury resulting from the defendant's conduct, which
14
Intel had not done.
The third and last example needs no specific legal case; indeed, no reported
civil cases have been litigated to judgment. 15 Consider a virus disseminated by
email that injures thousands of computer users by destroying files or damaging
hard drives. In every such instance there is usually some step that an operating
system seller or Intemet Service Provider could have taken to prevent the
spread of the virus. Some commentators have argued that operating system
sellers should be held strictly liable for viruses, since the expected liability
would cause the price of the relatively insecure operating system to rise in

1 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).

Id. at 46.
7 Id. at 51.
8 Id. at 52-53 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2000)).
6

Id. at 51.
10 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003).

9

11Id. at 299.
12 Id. at 301.
Id.
14 Id. at 306-07.
13

15One claim for damages was filed by a victim of identity theft in 2003. Steve Lohr,
Product Liability Lawsuits Are New Threat to Microsoft, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2003, at C2.
Additionally, there have been criminal prosecutions. See, e.g., Victor Homola, World
Briefing Europe: Germany: 'Sasser'HackerIs Sentenced, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2005, at A2.
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comparison to the relatively secure system.' 6 However, strict liability is not
the rule, and there have been no reported cases of third-party (or indirect)
liability for viruses.
Although there are many other examples of torts in cyberspace, 17 the
examples given present three general issues with which courts have only begun
to grapple. One issue, represented by the Blumenthal case, is whether Internet
Service Providers (or, more generally, those connected to the Interet) should
be immune from defamation and other information-based torts (e.g.,
intentional infliction of emotional distress) because the societal benefits of free
communication outweigh the isolated harms resulting from the relatively
infrequent intentional tort. Another issue, represented by Hamidi, is whether
the rules of trespass, nuisance, or negligence should apply to torts in
cyberspace. In terms familiar to legal academics, the question is whether
"property rules" or "liability rules" should apply to cyberspace torts. The last
issue, represented by the virus example, concerns the choice among liability
rules - should they be based on strict liability or negligence principles?
The underlying premise of this Article is that the theories reflected in tort
doctrine are general and ought to apply without any serious modifications to
cyberspace torts. There is no need for a special field of cybertort law.
However, because cyberspace torts are novel, they provide lawyers an
opportunity to gain a deeper appreciation and understanding of the rules that
they have studied for so long.
II.

GENERAL ISSUES

As the examples discussed in the previous section suggest, there are three
general issues raised by cyberspace torts. The first is whether, and specifically
where, property rules or liability rules should apply in this area of torts.
Property rules are exemplified by trespass doctrine. A property rule, such as
trespass, permits the party protected by the rule to enjoin the injuring party and
to collect damages for any violations that occur. Property rule protection
forces the potential injurer or invader to bargain with the protected party in
order to gain access to the protected party's property. In order to gain access
under the property rule, the invader will have to meet the demand price of the
protected party, which will be set high enough to cover the protected party for
all the injuries that party perceives to be associated with giving access to the
invader. If, for example, the invader is incapable of doing any harm to the
protected party's property, but the protected party still wants to be
compensated for the mere thought that someone else will have access to his
16 See,

e.g., Douglas Lichtman, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable,

REGULATION, Winter 2004-2005, at 54, 56-57; Doug Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding
Internet Service ProvidersAccountable, 14 SuP. CT. ECON. REv. 221, 233-40 (2006).

17See Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 3, at 4-8 (describing categories of cyber-attack
such as denial of service, viruses (or worms), phishes, spyware, trojan horses, and program
back doors).
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property, that perceived harm will be part of the price demanded of the
potential invader.
Liability rules, in contrast, do not permit the protected party to enjoin the
injuring party. For example, a negligence lawsuit brought against a careless
driver is an instance in which a victim asserts liability rule protection. There is
no background assumption that the careless driver should have obtained
permission from the victim to impose the risk of injury. The liability rule
seeks simply to reallocate to the injurer some objective estimate of the victim's
loss after the loss has occurred.
The second general issue raised by cyberspace torts is, assuming liability
rules apply, what type of liability rule should apply and where? Tort law
provides two general types of liability rule: strict liability and negligence. The
key difference between the two is that under negligence, courts inquire into the
care that the injurer took in his conduct, while under strict liability there is no
inquiry into the injurer's level of care. Strict liability sounds like "absolute
liability," in the sense of imposing liability simply for acting. But there are
few, if any, examples of absolute liability in the law. Most cases of strict
liability involve a point at which the injurer made a choice to impose harms on
the victim; for example, by choosing to locate his smoke-belching factory next
door to the victim's house. And it is this choice to impose harm that the law
aims to control through strict liability.
The third general issue raised by cyberspace torts is whether there should be
any liability at all. The issue is actually more complicated. Perhaps the better
way to state the issue is whether a liability rule weaker or more lenient than
negligence should apply. "Weak negligence" rules would couple the general
inquiry into fault under a traditional negligence rule with a set of broad
defenses that would often permit the injurer to avoid liability altogether.
Should there be absolute immunity or "weak negligence" in the field of
cyberspace, and specifically, where should immunity or weak negligence rules
apply?
I take up each of these issues in the following section, though I will focus on
torts generally. I will synthesize existing theories and extend them in order to
provide a framework that explains the overall shape as well as the details of
tort law. After setting out a positive framework, I will apply it to cyberspace
torts.
A.

PropertyRules Versus Liability Rules

In a famous 1972 essay, Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed answered
the general question of "property rules versus liability rules." 18 Their answer,
which can be summarized easily, depends largely on the distribution of
"transaction costs," i.e., the costs of arranging and completing a transaction to
transfer an entitlement. According to Calabresi and Melamed, property rules
18See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
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are desirable in settings where transaction costs are low, and liability rules are
desirable in settings where transaction costs are high. 19 Property rules are best
in low transaction cost settings because they protect entitlement holders from
expropriation and thereby encourage consensual transactions.
In high
transaction cost settings, bargaining is infeasible, so society establishes a
convention under which the entitlement can be transferred at an objectively
determined price. The standard liability rule, implemented by a court, provides
this convention.
There is another context in which property rules are desirable because they
unconditionally prohibit conduct. That is when the activity of the injuring
party is socially undesirable, regardless of the scale at which it is carried out.20
This category was implicit in the analysis of Calabresi and Melamed, 21 and has
been explored more explicitly in later articles. 22 Reckless conduct, such as
joy-riding at an excessive speed through a crowded area, serves as an example
of this property rule context.
The general scheme of tort law fits the Calabresi-Melamed theory well.
Property rules, exemplified by trespass doctrine, are observed in the context of
invasions to real or personal property, typically in settings in which the invader
easily could have bargained with the property holder to gain access. They are
also observed in cases of reckless conduct; here the law goes beyond imposing
a compensation requirement and enjoins such conduct outright.
Liability rules, on the other hand, are observed in settings such as traffic
accidents, where the parties could not have bargained beforehand to arrange a
price that would be paid for any specific injuries. The traffic accident setting is
one of the clearest cases in which transaction costs are high. The parties to a
potential traffic accident are often strangers and cannot identify each other in
advance.
In recent years, the simple two-part scheme of Calabresi and Melamed has
come under attack. Kaplow and Shavell, providing the most forceful critique,
argue that in the case of low transaction costs - fully informed agents who can
identify each other and bargain over the transfer of an entitlement - it does not
matter whether the property rule or the liability rule applies.23 Under either

19 Id. at 1106-09.
20 Keith N. Hylton, Property Rules and Liability Rules, Once Again, 2 REV. L. & ECON.

137, 174-75 (2006).
21 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 18, at 1124-27 (examining property rules and
liability rules in a criminal law context).
22 See Keith N. Hylton, The Theory of Penalties and the Economics of CriminalLaw, 1
REV. L. & ECON. 175, 184 (2005); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal
Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1201-05 (1985).
23 Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, PropertyRules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic
Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 733, 763 (1996).
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rule, bargains will take place, and as implied by the Coase theorem, 24
economically efficient trades will occur. Kaplow and Shavell also examine a
case in which the cost of meeting is low but the cost of reaching agreement is
high because of informational asymmetries. In this setting, they show that
25
liability rules may dominate property rules.
The critique provided by Kaplow and Shavell (and other scholars) 26 has
advanced the analysis of property and liability rules by incorporating a
rigorous analysis of bargaining incentives. However, the results of this new
literature can be reconciled with the original Calabresi-Melamed analysis. In
low transaction cost settings, property rules remain preferable to liability rules
because they deter takings, even efficient ones, and thereby protect subjective
components of valuation. 27 In the absence of such protection, potential victims
of takings would suffer weakened incentives to invest and victims would sue
or retaliate to recover losses, thus generating costs that would be avoided under
the property rule regime. 28 The information asymmetry case, on the other
hand, represents a difficult set of examples that do not fit so easily within the
high-versus-low transaction cost framework of Calabresi and Melamed. A
new synthesis should treat the information asymmetry case as a new category
29
altogether.

I think it is sufficient, in light of the new bargaining theory literature
exemplified by Kaplow and Shavell, to distinguish three transaction cost
categories: high, low, and intermediate.30 In addition, the costs of transacting
can be split into the costs of meeting and the costs of reaching an agreement. 31
If the costs of meeting are prohibitive, then transactions will not occur, and it is
clearly a case of high transaction costs. If the costs of meeting are low but the
costs of reaching an agreement are high, then we have intermediate transaction
costs. 32 If both the costs of meeting and the costs of reaching agreement are
low, then it is a case of low transaction costs.

24 For the original presentation of the Coase theorem, see R.H. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). According to the theorem, if transaction costs are low
parties will bargain their way to the most efficient allocation, irrespective of the initial
assignment of legal rights.
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 23, app. at 780-87.
See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal
Entitlement To FacilitateCoasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1036-47 (1995).
25

26

27 See Hylton, supra note 20, at 155-56. Even in a rigorous analysis of bargaining
incentives, it remains the case that liability rules result in expropriation, and expropriation
generates social costs.
28 See id. at 158-63.
29 See id. at 141.
30 See id. at 141-42.
31 See id. at 141 n.12.
32 The costs of reaching agreement could be substantial because of informational
asymmetries or because of difficulties in defining the entitlement to be transferred.
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If, then, we distinguish cases of high, low, and intermediate transaction
costs, we can state a proposition that incorporates the lessons from the
bargaining theory literature along with those of Calabresi and Melamed. In
low transaction cost settings (where both the costs of meeting and reaching
agreement are low), property rules are preferable to liability rules. In high
transaction cost settings, liability rules are preferable to property rules. In
intermediate transaction cost settings, either rule could dominate depending on
the balance between the costs of expropriation and the costs of failed
33
bargains.
To show the greater fit or predictive capacity of this framework, consider a
few examples of cases that fall within the intermediate transaction cost
category. One is nuisance law. The costs of meeting are low in the nuisance
setting because the parties are often adjacent landowners. However, the costs
of reaching an agreement are often substantial, because the precise entitlement
(e.g., clean air) is difficult to define.3 4 Another example is eminent domain.
The cost to the government of meeting a property owner to discuss a possible
purchase is low, but the cost of reaching agreement may be high because of the
holdout problem. 35 A liability rule is substituted for a property rule in both
settings because the costs of property rule protection are perceived to be higher
36
than the costs of liability rule protection.
B.

Choice Among Liability Rules: Strict Liability Versus Negligence

Assuming the conditions suggest that a liability rule is preferable to a
property rule, the second question is: what type of liability rule? The two
general types are strict liability and negligence. In mathematical models, strict
liability is often treated as if it were the same as absolute liability. 37 In the
same models, the negligence rule is often treated as if it were determined by
comparing the benefits of an additional precaution (in terms of avoidable
losses) with the burden of that precaution - an approach sometimes called the

33 A liability rule allows expropriation to occur, which generates social costs, either as a
result of the distorted incentives of victims or from the costly litigation that follows. A
property rule results in a loss in allocative efficiency when a bargain fails and a wealthenhancing transaction does not take place as a result. If the social costs of failed bargains
under the property rule are less than the social costs of expropriation under the liability rule,
the property rule is preferable. Otherwise the liability rule is preferable. Hylton, supra note

20, at 166-68.
31 See Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property
Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 24-26 (1985).
35 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 18, at 1106-07.
36 Hylton, supra note 20, at 168.
37 See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 9-22
(1980).
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"Hand formula. '38 However, both the strict liability and negligence rules
actually used by courts are more complicated than those captured by the
mathematical models. The strict liability rules that courts apply provide
justifications or defenses that an injurer can assert, rendering them far more
lenient than an absolute liability rule. 39 Negligence rules also provide special
justifications and defenses that allow an injurer to escape liability even when
the burden of an additional precaution is less than the benefit in terms of
40
avoidable losses.
For the moment, let us adhere to the simple division between strict liability
and negligence, without attempting to incorporate the special justifications and
defenses that make legal doctrine complicated. When should we prefer strict
liability to negligence?
One answer provided in the literature, from Guido Calabresi to Richard
Posner to Steven Shavell, is that negligence only controls care levels while
strict liability controls both care and activity levels. 4' By care level, I refer to
the instantaneous level of care that an individual adopts when engaging in an
activity. For example, one can increase his care level while driving by slowing
down and watching the road ahead more closely. By activity level, I refer to
the extent to which an individual engages in an activity. One can increase his
activity level in driving by using the car more frequently - say, driving three
times a day rather than twice.
Under the simplest economic models, strict liability and negligence have the
same effect on care levels. 42 Under either rule, an actor will always take
additional care as long as the cost of that care is less than the losses avoided by
that care. The reason is as follows. If additional care would cost $1 and would
avoid $2 in losses, the actor would clearly take that additional care under a
strict liability rule. He would certainly rather bear an additional $1 in
precaution costs rather than $2 in liability costs. The actor has the same
incentive under a negligence rule. As long as the additional precaution cost is
less than the losses that would be avoided, the actor would be held liable under
38 See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, The Influence of Litigation Costs on Deterrence Under

Strict Liability and Under Negligence, 10 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 161,

166-68 (1990)

(presenting a mathematical model of the negligence rule based on the "Hand formula,"
where an injurer who fails to take a precaution will be found negligent if the precaution's
marginal social benefit exceeds its marginal social cost).
39 Consider, for example, strict liability for dangerous activities, such as blasting. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts provides several provisions that introduce potential defenses.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § § 519-524A (1965).
40 The most obvious example of such a defense is contributory negligence. See
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 287-90 (8th ed. 2004) (explaining

the contributory negligence rule).
41 See Shavell, supra note 37, at 2-6. See generally GUIDO

CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF

ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of
Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
42 See Shavell, supra note 37, at 10-17.
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the negligence rule. Given this, his incentives for precaution are the same
under negligence as under strict liability.
Now consider the level of activity. Under strict liability, the actor pays for
injuries even though he has exercised the optimal level of precaution - optimal
in the sense that the burden of additional precaution would be greater than the
losses that would be avoided. Under negligence, the actor does not have to pay
for injuries when he has exercised the optimal level of precaution. Since the
overall activity costs are higher under strict liability, the actor is less likely to
engage in the activity. Hence it is said that strict liability reduces activity
43
levels while negligence does not.
The activity-versus-care-level distinction provides an explanation of the
effects of strict liability and negligence, but it falls short of providing a positive
theory of when one will encounter one rule rather than the other. For the most
part, strict liability rules are limited to specific pockets of tort law. The
activity-versus-care-level distinction does not help us predict which pockets
will be dominated by strict liability rules. One could say that strict liability
should be the rule whenever it is important to control activity levels, 44 but this
merely restates the question, forcing us to ask when it is important to control
activity rather than care levels. And since the activity level concern is a
general one, the activity-versus-care-level distinction suggests that strict
45
liability should be the default liability rule.
However, as stated above, strict liability rules are limited to special pockets
of tort law. For example, blasting in developed areas falls under the strict
liability rule. 46 If you engage in blasting in a residential area, you will be held
liable for all losses caused by concussion and debris, no matter how carefully
you conduct the blasting operation. 47 You will not be liable to a victim who is
considered "extra-sensitive" to the blasting operation when the victim claims
to have suffered harm in an instance in which an ordinary person would have
suffered no harm. 48 However, if you carry on blasting at a level that would
have caused some harm to the ordinary resident, you will be held liable for the
harms caused to residents, even if they are much greater than you would have
49
anticipated.

41 See id. at 2-6.

44 See Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1177 (7th Cir.
1990).
45 See Keith N. Hylton, The Theory of Tort Doctrine and the Restatement (Third) of

Torts, 54

VAND. L. REv. 1413, 1417 (2001).
46 See, e.g., Alonso v. Hills, 214 P.2d 50, 54 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950); Whitman Hotel

Corp. v. Elliott & Watrous Eng'g Co., 79 A.2d 591, 595 (Conn. 1951); Spano v. Perini

Corp., 250 N.E.2d 31, 33 (N.Y. 1969).
41 See, e.g.,Alonso, 214 P.2d at 54.
48 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 524A (1965) (exempting defendants from

strict liability for "Plaintiff's Abnormally Sensitive Activity").
" See id. § 524A cmt. a.
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The blasting example illustrates a general principle: strict liability rules are
observed when the costs externalized by an activity, even when conducted with
reasonable care, substantially exceed the benefits externalized by that
activity.50 In other words, where the ratio of externalized costs to externalized
benefits is unusually high, the law adopts a strict liability rule. The law
imposes strict liability in these cases to deter, discourage, or shrink the activity.
That explains why strict liability applies to blasting. Blasting imposes a
significant risk of harm on individuals who live or work near the blasting
operation, even when conducted with great care, and rarely provides some
contemporaneous benefit that makes it worth their while to tolerate those
harms. By imposing strict liability, the law internalizes the harms associated
with blasting, and thereby discourages the use of blasting relative to other
methods of destruction (such as a wrecking ball) in areas in which harm to
third parties is likely to occur.
The principle requiring comparison of externalized risks and benefits also
explains why keeping dangerous animals, like lions, falls under the strict
liability rule. 5 1 An individual who keeps a lion penned in his backyard
imposes a great risk on his neighbors, while providing no significant benefit unless the lion holder is operating a zoo. 52 In the absence of strict liability, the
holder alone enjoys the benefits of holding a lion, while substantial costs are
externalized to others (even when the holder takes reasonable care). Strict
liability corrects the lion holder's incentives by forcing him to compare his
private benefits to the full costs to his neighbors.
The doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher5 3 offers another illustration of the ratio
test described here. Rylands imposes strict liability for "non-natural" uses of
land that cause damage to others. In Rylands, strict liability was imposed on
the defendant when water escaped from a reservoir on his land and flooded
mines on the plaintiff's land.5 4 The court found that the storage of water under
the conditions in the case imposed an extraordinary risk on adjacent
landowners, greater than any reciprocal risk imposed by the adjacent
55
landowners.
50 Keith N. Hylton, A Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 977, 986

(1996).

" See, e.g., Baker v. Snell, (1908) 2 K.B. 825, 828.
52 See, e.g., Guzzi v. N.Y. Zoological Soc'y, 182 N.Y.S. 257, 259 (N.Y. App. Div.

1920), affd, 135 N.E. 897, 897 (N.Y. 1922) (distinguishing holding a bear in a zoo from
nuisance per se cases because the zoo served an educational function); City of Denver v.
Kennedy, 476 P.2d 762, 763 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970) (holding that absolute liability for
injuries caused by wild animals does not apply to animals exhibited in zoos).
51 (1868) 3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330 (H.L.).
54 Id. at 338-39.
55 See id. at 332. Reciprocal risk creation is an alternative way of thinking about the ratio
test described above. If both injurer and victim impose equivalent risks on each other, then
this is the same scenario, in terms of economics, as the case in which the risks externalized
by the injurer's activity are offset by the benefits externalized.
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The case Rickards v. Lothian56 gives the best illustration of the function of
externalized benefits in the Rylands doctrine.
The defendant leased a
commercial building with a lavatory on the fourth floor. 57 The plaintiff was a
tenant whose business occupied part of the second floor.5 8 An unknown
person snuck into the building late one night, stuffed the sink, turned the faucet
on full blast, and left it running ovemight. 59 The next morning, the plaintiff
found his stock-in-trade (largely schoolbooks) ruined and brought a strict
liability suit against the defendant on the theory that the introduction of the
lavatory was equivalent to the reservoir in Rylands.60 The court rejected the
plaintiff's claim. 6' The court declared that "[t]he provision of a proper supply
of water to the various parts of a house is not only reasonable, but has become,
in accordance with modem sanitary views, an almost necessary feature of town
life." 62
The distinction between Rickards and Rylands is that the ratio of
externalized benefits to externalized costs differs significantly in the two cases.
In Rickards, the provision of water supply to a building provides benefits to all
who use the building. These benefits are difficult to capture in the rental fee
demanded of a tenant, and it is quite unlikely that the tenant's use of water was
metered with a charge that reflected the marginal benefit to the tenant of water
use. Since the externalized benefits in this scenario were substantial, there is
no reason to believe that the risk externalized by the introduction of a lavatory
exceeded the externalized benefits. However, in Rylands the court had no
trouble concluding that the externalized risks exceeded the externalized
benefits.
It remains to fold into this analysis the function of transaction costs.
Rylands establishes the law for a set of cases sometimes referred to as
"abnormally dangerous activities. ' '63 For simplicity I will refer to these as "the
Rylands cases." If transaction costs are low in the Rylands cases, one might
argue that they should be treated as just another set of cases in which property
rule protection, such as trespass law, should be adopted. However, transaction
costs are higher in the Rylands cases than in ordinary trespass cases for several
reasons. First, the injurer in the Rylands setting is not directly attempting to
invade the victim's land. He is merely bringing something onto his own land
that might escape. Second, the direction of the potential escape may not be
clear, making it difficult to bargain ex ante over a waiver for the harm that
might occur. A large number of potential victims creates the risk that one or
56 [1913] A.C. 263 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Austi.).

57Id. at 267.
58 Id.

59Id. at 268-69.
60 Id. at 274-75.
61 Id. at 279-80.
62

Id. at 281.

63 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1965).
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more will step forward and demand to be paid off even though the risk to them
is slight. Transaction costs are therefore considerably higher in the Rylands
than in the trespass setting because of the difficulty of identifying ex ante the
parties that will be injured and the nature of their injuries. For this reason,
Rylands cases should be treated as either intermediate or high transaction cost
cases.
Nuisance cases are quite similar to Rylands cases and should therefore be
treated as equivalent in terms of the factors considered here. Transaction costs
in most nuisance cases are either intermediate or high. As Merrill notes, the
entitlement at stake in nuisance cases is often difficult to define (e.g., the right
to clean air or absence of noise). 64 The difficulty of defining the entitlement
makes it hard for parties to bargain over its value. 65 Moreover, nuisances have
the potential to generate large numbers of victims, which also makes
66
bargaining over rights difficult.
The foregoing argument can be summarized in a simple diagram. There are
three transaction costs categories: high, intermediate, and low. The ratio test
requires a comparison of an activity's externalized costs to its externalized
benefits (EC versus EB in the diagram below). This framework generates six
cases to consider.
Figure 1. Transaction Costs, Externalization, and Liability Rules

EC > EB

EC < EB

High Transaction
Costs
Liability Rule:
Strict Liability
(or Property Rule if
injurer's activity is
socially undesirable)

Intermediate
Transaction Costs
Hybrid Property/
Liability Rule:
Nuisance
(plaintiff required to
show unreasonable
interference)

Low Transaction
Costs
Property Rule:
Trespass

Liability Rule:
Negligence

Liability Rule:
Weak Negligence

Liability Rule:
Weak Negligence

The "weak negligence" rules described in Figure 1 refer to areas in which a
quasi-property rule protects the injurer rather than the victim. For example, in

I Merrill, supra note 34, at 23-24.

Id. at 25.
refer specifically to the holdout problems that would arise in this scenario. For
example, if a polluter had to gain the consent of a thousand town residents before starting
65

66 1

production, some of the residents might realize that they could gain an advantage by holding
out for a payment close to the profit stream of the polluting firm. See A. MITCHELL
POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 13-16 (3d ed. 2003) (examining the

Coase theorem in a large-numbers setting).
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the last cell (low transaction costs and EC < EB), we encounter legal rules that
require proof of intent to harm in order to find the injurer liable. Defamation is
an example of such a rule. The law provides several defenses that effectively
immunize tort defendants, and this was so even before New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan.67 Defamation law has included so many defenses that one could
describe it as an area in which the plaintiff must show specific intent to harm in
order to recover. 68 As a general rule, "information torts" such as defamation
and intentional infliction of emotional distress generally fall in the category in
which transaction costs are low and the externalized benefits of the defendant's
activity exceed the externalized costs. 69 And with respect to information torts,
one typically observes substantial defenses and high burdens in the way of tort
70
plaintiffs.
In the penultimate cell (intermediate transaction costs and EC < EB), the
negligence rule applies, but there are substantial defenses that come very close
to providing immunity to the defendant. For example, medical malpractice is
an area in which transaction costs can be described as intermediate: the costs of
meeting are low while, due to informational asymmetry, the costs of reaching
agreement are high. Also, the externalized costs connected to the activity are
generally less than the externalized benefits. 71 Here the law tends to favor the
injurer. Although juries may sometimes be vulnerable to persuasion by
72
plaintiffs lawyers, the law provides a substantial custom defense for doctors.

67 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
68 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW

132-42 (Dover 1991) (1881)

(discussing actions for deceit and slander).
69 To elaborate, because the external benefits of speech are substantial, the law has
provided a subsidy, in effect, to speakers by allowing them to be held liable under an intentto-harm rather than a negligence rule. Consider, for example, how defamation law fits
within this framework. The activity level decision in the news business is whether and how
often to publish. Taking care in the news business is a matter of thoroughly researching
claims in articles and opinion pieces. A strict or absolute liability standard would hold
newspapers liable for any defamatory claims, whether carefully researched or not. A
negligence standard would hold a publisher liable for any failure to take care in research that
resulted in defamatory claims. An intent-to-harm standard, which is close to the real law,
would hold a publisher liable only when the evidence suggested some malice or bad intent.
The law adopts the most lenient standard for potential defendants, which is the intent-toharm approach, and in doing so provides a partial subsidy to news publishers. The
negligence standard would be too strict, under this Article's framework, because it fails to
credit the defendant for the benefits externalized by free expression.
70 See, e.g., Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80 (adopting a requirement of "actual malice"
before defamation liability exists).
71 One could represent the external cost and external benefit comparison in terms of
marginal benefit and marginal cost curves. For this approach, see Hylton, supra note 50, at
984-93.
72 For a discussion of the custom defense in medical malpractice, see, for example,
EPSTEIN, supra note 40, at 204.
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The existence of defenses that virtually immunize defendants reflects a type
of property rule lurking behind the categories shown in the bottom row of
Figure 1. When externalized benefits exceed externalized costs, the underlying
property rule should be awarded to the injurer. That is, the injurer should have
a right to engage in his activity without fear of being enjoined or of being
strictly liable for potential accidents. If society is made better off, after all, by
the very activity that causes injury, that activity should be encouraged. As
transaction costs fall, potential victims would be in a better position to demand
payments and to effectively enjoin the defendant's activity if the underlying
property rule protected the victim. For this reason, it would be undesirable to
award the property rule to the victim. The law, in effect, reverses the property
rule from its usual position protecting the victim and makes it a shield for the
potential injurer, by providing defenses of broad scope.
When transaction costs are high, liability rules predominate except in one
instance shown in Figure 1. When the injurer's activity is socially undesirable,
which means that the social costs from the injurer's activity exceed the social
benefits at every scale of the activity, 73 the property rule reappears. This
exception covers the cases of reckless activity and activity that presents a
danger to the public (such as terrorism).
11.

APPLICATION TO CYBERSPACE

The central premise of this Article is that tort law can be applied to
cyberspace wrongs in a way that is reconcilable with established tort doctrine.
However, we first need a clear view of the theoretical foundations of tort
doctrine. The foregoing discussion set out that view. The remaining parts
apply it to cyberspace torts.
A.

Nonconsensual Cyber-Invasions: PropertyRules Versus Liability Rules

I have already described Hamidi, which involved the transmission of
thousands of messages to the employer-provided email accounts of Intel
employees, as a case involving the choice between property rules and liability
rules in cyberspace. Hamidi is one example within a class of torts that can be
called cyber-invasions. Cyber-invasions can occur in two forms. In one set of
instances, the invader violates norms governing publicly accessible
information portals: he sends spam email, or he collects information from a
website for a purpose that breaches the terms of a "click-through" agreement,
or he collects information for a purpose that the information provider would
find objectionable (such as competing against the information provider). 74 In
the other set of instances, the invader goes around barriers to alter privately
73 In terms of marginal benefit and marginal cost curves, this would be a case in which
the marginal benefit curve is below the marginal cost curve at all activity levels.
74 See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004); eBay, Inc. v.
Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d
296 (Cal. 2003).
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75
I will
held records or to access information that is not publicly available.
consider each type of cyber-invasion in turn.

1.

Invading a Public Information Resource

The first type of cyber-invasion I want to consider, invasion of a public
information resource, involves cases such as the sending of spam email in
Hamidi. I refer to this as a public resource invasion because the recipient of
spam email holds his email box open to the public; there is no expectation or
requirement that an email sender first get permission to send an email. Spam
email can be viewed as an invasion because the typical recipient finds it
undesirable.
Recall that in Hamidi, the court accepted the plaintiffs theory that trespass
to chattels (i.e., trespass to personal property) was a claim that could result in
76
injunctive or compensatory relief against the sender of spam email.
However, the court held that in order to enjoin the defendant's conduct, the
plaintiff had to bring evidence of substantial harm to his property. 77 Intel had
produced no evidence that Hamidi's actions actually harmed the company's
electronic mail system, and for that reason the court refused to enjoin
78
Hamidi.
Other cases exist in which the trespass-to-chattels theory has been accepted,
leading to an injunction. For example, in eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 79
the court held that the plaintiff, eBay, could enjoin Bidder's Edge from sending
electronic spiders to its website because those spiders were thought to be
80
capable of impairing the functioning of eBay's website.
The first question raised by Hamidi is a general one concerning the power to
enjoin. The plaintiffs power to enjoin the defendant's conduct has been a
relatively murky issue in the law of trespass to chattels. The Restatement has
taken the position that the plaintiff in a trespass to chattels action cannot enjoin
the defendant's conduct unless he can show that it actually causes injury. 8'
However, some courts have suggested that the mere trespass to chattel gives
rise to a right to seek damages and to enjoin the defendant's conduct. These

75 See, e.g., Physicians Interactive v. Lathian Sys., Inc., No. CA-03-1193-A, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22868 (E.D. Va. Dec. 5, 2003).
76 Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 300.
17 Id. at 303.

78Id. at 303-04, 311.
79 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
80Id. at 1073; see also Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 395 (2d Cir.
2004) (enjoining Verio from, inter alia, accessing Register.com's computers with automated
computer programs).
81 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 cmt. e, illus. 2 (1965) ("A, a child,
climbs upon the back of B's large dog and pulls its ears. No harm is done to the dog, or to
any other legally protected interest ofB. A is not liable to B.").
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courts have proceeded under the view that the law governing trespass to
82
chattels and that governing trespass to real property should be the same.
When established law gives an uncertain or doubtful answer, theory should
play a role in figuring out what the law should be. Why has the law given
plaintiffs a power to enjoin under traditional (real property) trespass law? The
reason, according to the theory of property rules, is to protect the plaintiffs
subjective valuation of his property. If the plaintiff cannot enjoin another
party's use, then that party can expropriate or destroy all or part of the value of
the plaintiff's property. In view of this, there is no clear reason that the power
to enjoin should be weaker in the case of personal property than it is in the case
of real property.
Suppose, for example, a third party happens to find a key that matches my
car's ignition. Assume I make little use of my car - say, only on Sundays and otherwise don't see the car because I park it in a garage far from my house.
The third party uses the car without my consent and without causing any
measurable or perceptible damage of any sort - e.g., he uses the car as a
meeting place for trysts with his paramour. Should I lose the power to enjoin
or to seek damages simply because I cannot prove that the third party's use
actually damages my car? The theory of property rules suggests that I should
not lose the power to enjoin, because the power to enjoin permits me to
demand compensation for whatever subjective loss I suffer in having my car
used by the third party.
This implies that the property holder under trespass law should, as a default
rule, always have the power to enjoin, whether the property is real or personal.
To weaken that power, as courts have done in Hamidi and eBay, is to
undermine one of the fundamental protections provided by trespass doctrine.
These cases refuse to grant plaintiffs the power to enjoin even though property
rule protection appears to be appropriate in the court's eyes. 83 The danger is
that this approach could leach back into ordinary trespass rules governing real
property.
The second question raised by Hamidi is whether property rule protection
really is appropriate in the circumstances. This depends on several factors,
summarized earlier in Figure 1. The first factor is transaction costs: the case
82 See,

e.g., Blondell v. Consol. Gas Co., 43 A. 817, 819 (Md. 1899) ("[W]hether the

alleged acts [tampering with the plaintiffs gas meter] were or were not productive of injury,
they were, in the eye of the law, trespasses .. "). Moreover, English common law did not
require a showing of substantial harm in a trespass-to-chattels action. See Shyamkrishna
Balganesh, Property Along the Tort Spectrum: Trespass to Chattels and the AngloAmerican DoctrinalDivergence, 35 COMMON L. WORLD REv. 135, 141 (2006).
83 To be clear, this is not to say that property rule protection really is appropriate under
the Hamidi or eBay fact patterns. Rather, I argue that the courts in eBay and Hamidi have
made the confusing statement that (a) property rule protection is appropriate, and (b) in
order to protect the interests at stake the only remedy they would permit is a liability rule.
For an alternative description of the confusion, in doctrinal terms, see Mossoff, supra note
4, at 645.
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for property rule protection becomes stronger as transaction costs fall. Second,
the direction of property rule protection has to be determined.

Should it

protect the victim or the invader? Answering this question requires a
comparison of the externalized costs and benefits of the injurer's activity.
As it becomes easier for a cyberspace user to gain permission before
sending an email or accessing a website (i.e., as transaction costs fall), the case
for protecting someone with a property rule becomes stronger. A property rule
protecting the potential victim would be equivalent to the familiar trespass law.
A property rule protecting the invader (e.g., the email sender) would be
equivalent to one of the weak negligence rules described earlier. For example,
the rule could establish a right to send an email unless the sender waives the
right or knows in advance of some specific and substantial harm that the email
will bring to the recipient.
As the court itself noted in Hamidi, this is a bit like asking whether there
should be a property rule governing phone calls. 84 The answer seems
relatively clear in that case. A person acquires a phone in order to
communicate with others. Indeed, its value rises directly in proportion to the
number of others who also have phones. A phone, a fax machine, and an
electronic mail system are all examples of communication portals that allow us
to connect to others. Although it might be relatively cheap to contact one
person in order to seek permission to place a phone call to him, in the
aggregate this would be a costly system and would destroy a substantial part of
the network value of the phone system. The expense would be unnecessary, in
addition, since most people would agree to being contacted by phone. If any
property rule is desirable in the case of telephone calls, it would appear to be
one that protects the invader (i.e., the person initiating the call).
The same argument applies to the email system in Hamidi. Although it
would be simple for one individual to contact another, or for a corporation to
seek permission to send an email, it would entail a substantial cost when
viewed in light of the interest in rapid unintrusive contact that motivates people
to use email in the first place. Given the network effects that make ownership
of an email account valuable, the system-wide costs of a property rule
protecting potential recipients of unwanted mail could be enormous. In
addition, because the whole purpose of the system is to allow rapid and
widespread communication, the vast majority of users would waive property
rule protection if it were given to them. Since people acquire email accounts
as a communication portal, the value they perceive expropriated by the
occasional unwanted email is trivial.
The upshot is that trespass, which operates as a property rule protecting the
victim, is an inappropriate rule to apply to cases like Hamidi involving
unwanted emails and to cases like eBay involving website access. Indeed, the
reason courts have applied a diluted trespass rule (requiring substantial harm)
to certain types of cyber-invasion is that they recognize the costs of property
84

See Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 300 (Cal. 2003).
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rule protection favoring email recipients or website operators. While accepting
the plaintiffs trespass-to-chattels theory, the Hamidi court spoke at length
about the inconveniences created by rules requiring consent in these settings. 85
Given that a property rule protecting the victim is inappropriate, what is the
proper tort rule to apply to unwanted emails? In the case of a single email or
the typical email exchange, the underlying activity is one in which the
externalized benefits generally exceed the externalized costs. This is true in
general for "information torts" - because information is a public good, the law
tends to set standards that are difficult for plaintiffs to satisfy. Since the
transaction costs are often low in the case of a single email, a property rule is
certainly feasible in this area. The foregoing analysis suggests that the
preferable property rule (assuming some type of property rule is appropriate) is
one protecting the invader/email initiator. This suggests that the ideal rule, in
the case of an unwanted email that causes harm to the recipient, would hold the
email sender liable only if he knew with substantial certainty that the email
recipient would be harmed by opening the email. In other words, in terms of
the analysis summarized in Figure 1, the ideal rule is a weak negligence rule.
Of course, with emails, as with all things, there can be too much of a good
thing. Suppose, instead of a single email, we are considering a spammer who
sends 50,000 emails at a time to a single server. What tort rule should apply?
The spammer's activity is generally desirable in the case of a single email or a
reasonable number of emails. But spammers create burdens on recipients by
sending thousands of emails at a time. 86 The conduct has characteristics most
common with nuisances. 87 The spammer's conduct imposes externalized
losses that often exceed the externalized gains. In addition, transaction costs
are in some respects low, and in others quite high, in the email context. A
person who wants to engage in mass distribution of email after first gaining the
consent of recipients would run into the holdout problems that arise in
nuisance settings. 88 Given these characteristics, mass email distribution that
results in harm to recipients belongs in the same category as nuisances
resulting in unreasonable interferences (in terms of Figure 1, the second cell).
This analysis applies to eBay as well. In general, if a programmer sends
electronic spiders through the Interet to gather information and relay it to
another source, say another website, that activity merely enhances the
dissemination of information. Enhanced information dissemination allows

81 Id. at 308-11. However, technology could drive transaction costs so low that a system
of prior consent for emails could become operational with no obstruction to the value of the
network. At present, that does not appear to be the case.
86 See Mossoff, supra note 4, at 650-52 (detailing burdens imposed by spanmers).
87 For the argument that the harms suffered in spain cases seem closest to the harms
observed in nuisance cases, see Burk, supra note 4, at 53; Edward Lee, Rules and Standards
for Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275, 1283-84 (2002); Lemley, supra note 4, at

540; O'Rourke, supra note 4, at 620. See generally Mossoff, supra note 4.
8 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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markets to work more efficiently in allocating resources. For this reason, the
externalized benefits of the programmer's conduct probably exceed the
externalized costs. In addition, because of the holdout problems encountered
in the nuisance and Rylands settings, the transaction costs under a property rule
could be quite high.
These arguments suggest that a property rule protecting the victim of
spidering would be socially undesirable. For reasons similar to those given in
the spammer context, nuisance theory has a better fit to the problem. If
spidering occurs on a scale that disrupts the functioning of the victim's
website, as the court believed had occurred in eBay,89 then the injurer's activity
should be deemed an unreasonable interference under nuisance theory.
An alternative theory of the harm in eBay is that the information
dissemination itself might have harmed eBay by steering potential users away
from the eBay site.90 This is a doubtful theory on which to award tort
damages. Tort law early on took the position that competition itself does not
give rise to a claim for damages. If a business sets up close to a rival and
charges lower prices, that rival has no claim for damages under tort law. 91
Given this long-standing common law rule, it would seem quite strange for a
court to award damages to eBay on the theory that Bidder's Edge would take
business away from it by disseminating information more widely about
alternatives available to potential customers.
If there is an argument for damages under this alternative theory, it would be
based on the doctrine developed in business tort cases, and in ancient nuisance
cases. For example, some of the earliest business tort cases, cast as nuisance
cases, involved cream-skimming competition among local markets or fairs. A
rival who set up a fair on the road leading to an established one could be held
liable for nuisance. The intuition for this is that the rival's activity is a
particularly discouraging form of free riding. At the time when fairs were a
common method of forming markets in which sellers and buyers could meet, it
must have been quite costly for an entrepreneur to establish one. Finding
sellers and advertising to potential buyers would have required a great deal of
effort. A competitor who waited for the entrepreneur to invest in this way, and
then set up a competing fair on the most-traveled route, could easily skim away
a large part of the entrepreneur's profit while investing only a fraction of the

'9

See eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2000).

90 For the most persuasive version of this argument, see Daniel Kearney, Note, Network
Effects and the Emerging Doctrine of Cybertrespass,23 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 313 (2005).
Keamey puts forward the theory that in the presence of network externalities, it may be
optimal to protect a monopoly. Breaking up the monopoly leads to some efficiency losses.
While this theory suggests that private steps to maintain a monopoly may be socially
justifiable in the presence of network externalities, it does not readily imply that the law
should be altered to protect some firms (specifically those that produce a service that
generates network externalities) from competition.
91 See HOLMES, supra note 68, at 144-45.
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cost. If this conduct were allowed to go unimpeded, few entrepreneurs would
92
have established fairs in the first place.
One could try to extend the reasoning of these ancient nuisance cases to the
eBay case. However, to avoid creating a set of rules that obstruct competition,
courts would have to put sharp limits on the type of case that would receive
such treatment. It would have to be a case in which the late entrant's efforts
(1) took advantage of a substantial investment on the part of the initial entrant,
and (2) had the effect of denying the initial entrant a suitable return on his
investment. 93 The misappropriation theory recognized by the Supreme Court
in InternationalNews Service v. Associated Press provides a useful approach
94
to setting limits to a theory based on harmful competition.
Property rules protecting victims of spain email or spiders are generally
inappropriate, given the theoretical structure of tort law. If there is any
property rule that should underlie this activity at all, it is one protecting the
invader (e.g., the email sender), since his conduct is generally beneficial to
society. If the victim is to be protected at all, liability rules rather than
property rules should apply generally. Cases such as Hamidi and eBay seem
particularly well suited for the liability rule approach exemplified by nuisance
doctrine. This is not to say that property rules protecting victims could never
be appropriate for cyberspace. Indeed, if transaction costs are low and the
injurer's activity is of low social utility, a property rule protecting the victim
could be appropriate. But the cases of invasion of a public information
resource that the courts have dealt with under the trespass-to-chattels doctrine
do not fit this description. For those cases, nuisance doctrine, not trespass,
provides the better framework.

92

See

KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMMON LAW

EVOLUTION

213 (2003).

9' See id.

9 See Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 245-46 (1918) (upholding an

injunction that forbid the International News Service to take news from East Coast
Associated Press papers and print it in West Coast papers in its own network). For a
discussion of the case, see generally Douglas G. Baird, Property, Natural Monopoly, and
the Uneasy Legacy of INS v. AP (Chi. Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 246,
2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstractid=730024.

The misappropriation theory seems applicable to cases such as EF Cultural Travel BV v.
Explorica, Inc., 274

F.3d

577 (1st Cir. 2001), and Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d

393 (2d Cir. 2004). In Explorica, the new competitor (Explorica) used a specially designed
search robot to gather information on prices from the incumbent firm's (EF's) website,
using inside information on the website's structure. Explorica then used the information to
undercut EF's prices. Explorica, 274 F.3d at 579. In Register.com, the new competitor
(Verio) used a search robot to obtain information on entities that had registered their
internet-domain names through Register.com. Verio then contacted the registrants to solicit
business. Some of those registrants had requested that their information not be used for
solicitation purposes. Register.corn, 356 F.3d at 396-97. Neither case was decided on the
basis of the misappropriation theory.
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Invading a Private Information Resource

The second type of cyber-invasion involves going around barriers to gain
access to privately held information. For example, consider a database that is
accessible only to customers who pay a fee. Suppose a non-customer gains
access to the database by breaking a code that is available only to paying
customers or to a certain class of customers. 95 Alternatively, consider the case
of a psychiatrist who goes beyond the scope of her authority to peruse medical
records of patients, simply to satisfy her own curiosity. 96 Or suppose a
programmer writes a "Trojan Horse" program that invades the victim's
computer by arriving as an email attachment from a familiar source, and then
97
distributes information from that computer to others.
Would a property rule protecting the victim, such as the trespass-to-chattels
doctrine, be desirable in these cases? This question returns us to the factors
that make property rules desirable. A property rule is desirable when
transaction costs are low. A property rule protecting the victim (rather than the
injurer) is desirable when the underlying activity of the injurer externalizes
more costs than benefits.
Transaction costs have to be examined in light of the reality of social
intercourse. In the case of uninvited emails, the background rule governing
social intercourse is one that approves of the sending of uninvited email.
Individuals acquire communication portals, such as telephones or email
accounts, so that others can reach them without first having to obtain an
invitation.9 8 In the cases in which the invader accesses private information,
such as by breaking an access code or by using a Trojan Horse, there is no
sense in which potential victims accept this as part of the cost of acquiring a
computer that connects to the Intemet.99 Any invasion of private information
95 See, e.g., Physicians Interactive v. Lathian Sys., Inc., No. CA-03-1193-A, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22868, at *1 (E.D. Va. Dec. 5, 2003).
96 See, e.g., Doe v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock Med. Ctr., No. 00-100-M, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10704, at *5 (D.N.H. July 19, 2001).
9 See Timothy L. O'Brien, Gone Spear-Phishin': For a New Breed of Hackers, This
Time It's Personal,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2005, § 3, at 1.
98 And at least in the case of telephones, the owner can take positive steps to avoid being

contacted by strangers, such as refusing to allow the number to be listed in public sources.
So if the owner makes the phone number available in public sources, it is fair to infer that he
is willing to be contacted by strangers or by people who have not been invited to call.
99 The consent issue is also present in the case of "spyware" software that monitors a
computer user's activities. Most spyware finds its way onto computers after users click on a
download button. See Alan F. Blakley, Daniel B. Garrie & Matthew J. Armstrong,
Coddling Spies:

Why

the Law

Doesn't Adequately Address

Computer Spyware,

2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 25, 4, http://www.law.duke.edu/joumals/dltr/articles/PDF/
2005DLTR0025.pdf. Most users are unaware that by "click[ing] through" they have agreed
to accept spyware on their machines. Id. The difficulty in the spyware case, which
distinguishes it from the Trojan Horse, is that a person who "clicks through" may be saying,
in effect, that he is indifferent about the spyware that may be downloaded as a result, as long
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should be presumed to expropriate something of value unless it occurs with the
consent of the invaded party. Moreover, since the cost of gaining consent is
low, the cases of invaders who access private information should be treated as
occurring in a low transaction cost setting. This implies that a property rule is
desirable in the context of cyber-invasions of private information stocks.
Should the property rule protect the victim? As a general default rule
covering tangible and intangible things, a rule protecting the possessor is
superior to its alternative, because the possessor is likely to value the thing
more than some other party; while a rule protecting invaders would lead
countless non-possessors to threaten invasion simply to be paid off. 00
Moreover, there is nothing socially desirable about the conduct of an invader
who gains access to another's private information without consent. The
invader simply takes something of value to the victim rather than paying for it.
The conduct is no more valuable to society than any other type of theft.
The theory of property rules suggests that property rule protection is valid in
the case of an invasion of private information - such as Trojan Horses,
surveillance, and cyber-burglary in the form of breaking access codes. This
implies that courts should recognize a right to enjoin even if the plaintiff
cannot prove that he suffered substantial harm. For example, the psychiatric
patient whose medical records are examined by a doctor, not for treatment
purposes but just out of curiosity, should be permitted to enjoin the conduct
and seek damages even in the absence of proof of some material injury. 1 1 The
substantial harm requirement of Hamidi seems clearly inappropriate in this
setting.
It follows that plaintiffs should be able to seek punitive damage awards
against invaders of private information. In some cases, the victim's loss will
not be easy to determine, and a punitive award may be the simplest way to
motivate litigation and at the same time deter invaders. Punitive awards should
be set so that they at least eliminate any prospect of gain on the part of the
102
invader and internalize the loss suffered by the victim.
Public enforcement through criminal penalties may also be appropriate in
some instances involving invasion of private information resources. These
invasions share a great deal in common with environmental crimes. There is
often a low probability of detection, which in turn introduces collective action

as the spyware is not harmful to him. Because of this difficulty, courts considering the
consent question in so-called "clickwrap" cases have reached inconsistent conclusions.
Compare, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29-32 (2d Cir. 2002)
(finding no consent), with i.LAN Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d
328, 338 (D. Mass. 2002) (finding consent).
100See Hylton, supra note 20, at 149.
101See, e.g., Dartmouth-HitchcockMed. Ctr., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10704, at *5, *16.
102 Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO.
L.J. 421, 439 (1998).
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problems at the enforcement stage. 10 3 In addition, the damage awards that will
be imposed through private litigation are unlikely to be severe enough to serve
as an adequate deterrent. 1°4 Criminal statutes, such as the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act,10 5 can serve as alternative methods of deterrence in this setting.
In the general analysis of property and liability rules, property rules are
desirable in low transaction cost settings and in high transaction cost settings in
which the injurer's activity is always socially undesirable. The discussion so
far has focused on instances in which a property rule is desirable in the
cyberspace context primarily because transaction costs are low. For example,
the psychiatrist who uses the Internet to peruse the private medical records of a
patient without authorization has the option of seeking consent from the
patient.
There are other examples in which the injuring party has no specific target
and, therefore, would find it hard to gain consent. In these examples,
transaction costs are high. Still, society may prefer to apply a property rule on
the ground that the underlying activity of the injuring party has no social value
whatsoever. One example would be posting virus-contaminated files on the
Internet. This is analogous to leaving a package with a bomb in a parking lot.
In this case, the cost of transacting with the victim is high because the injurer
does not know who the victim will be. Still, since the injurer's conduct has no
value to society whatsoever, a property rule protecting the victim should apply.
In the event that an injured party brings suit, the injuring party's activity is a
candidate for an injunction and for punitive damages.
Generally, both punitive awards and criminal penalties require evidence that
the defendant intended to harm the victim or was at least indifferent to the
victim's welfare. 10 6 The issue of intent may generate exceptional cases in

which a cyber-invasion of a private resource has occurred and yet punitive
sanctions are inappropriate. Consider, for example, the case of a teenage
computer prodigy who invades a private information resource in order to show
his technical prowess to friends, rather than to harm anyone or to exploit the
information he obtains. 10 7 The harm done by the prodigy may still be
103 See Keith

N. Hylton,

When Should We Prefer Tort Law to Environmental

Regulation?,41 WASHBURN L.J. 515, 517-19 (2002).
104 See id. at 518.

105 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000) (making it a crime to gain unauthorized access to computers
in order to obtain certain types of nonpublic information).
106 See, e.g., Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 35 (7th Cir. 1996); Proctor v. Davis, 682
N.E.2d 1203, 1216 (I11.App. Ct. 1997).

107 See, e.g., Chris Cobbs, Hackers Snare Web Seeking 'Trophies,' ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Feb. 11, 2000, at Al (observing that some teenage cyber-offenders "are motivated not by a
desire for profit, but by the urge to show off"); Bill Goodwin, Mitnick: Feel Foolish if
Sasser Hit You, ZONE-H, May 21, 2004, http://www.zone-h.org/content/view/4183/31

(quoting virus technologist Graham Cluley, who stated that in addition to "'criminal
writers' of computer viruses there are also hackers whose goal is simply "' showing off to
friends and computer geeks.').
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substantial and deserving of punishment. However, this example suggests that
cyber-invasions of private information resources may occur in settings in
which the intent to harm is lacking, which should moderate demands for
punitive damages or criminal penalties.
Type of Liability Rule

B.

I have argued to this point that property rules are appropriate for cyberinvasions of private information resources (e.g., Trojan Horses that steal or
destroy information) and for the always socially undesirable activity of
unleashing viruses. On the other hand, property rules protecting victims would
be inappropriate for cyber-invasions of public information resources (e.g.,
spain email).
If property rules protecting victims are generally inappropriate for
cyberspace invasions of public information resources, what sorts of liability
rules should be adopted? Specifically, should courts adopt strict liability,
negligence, or a rule of no liability in some settings? To answer these
questions, we will have to consider the different settings in which liability for
cyberspace torts might be asserted.
First, consider the problem of cybersecurity. 0 8 A few examples will
demonstrate the damage that hackers can inflict when they take advantage of
deficiencies in Intemet security. The Love Bug virus, launched on May 4,
2000, altered graphic and music files, making them useless.' 0 9 People who had
spent countless hours building up electronic libraries of music found their work
destroyed. The virus affected roughly forty-five million computers and is
estimated to have caused almost $10 billion in damage worldwide. 10 The
Sobig virus is estimated to have caused almost $30 billion in losses
worldwide."' The Klez virus caused nearly $14 billion in damage. 12 In
addition to viruses, theft of information represents another source of harm that

108

On the economics of cybercrime and its prevention, see THE LAW AND ECONOMICS

OF

CYBERSECURITY 1-9 (Mark F. Grady & Francesco Parisi eds., 2006), and Neal Kumar
Katyal, CriminalLaw in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1003, 1004-13 (2001). One could

say that cybersecurity is a general problem that encompasses every case discussed in this
Article. For example, perhaps better cybersecurity would have prevented Hamidi from
distributing thousands of emails to Intel's employees. However, I will use cybersecurity

here to refer to threats posed by hackers or virus creators.
109 Cybercrime: Piercing the Darkness, http://library.thinkquest.org/04oct/00460/
ILoveYou.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2007); see also Benjamin Pimentel, Hacker Tries To Put
'Lovebug' Behind, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 11, 2001, at BI (presenting an interview with the

creator of the Love Bug virus, who, interestingly, contends that his actions did not constitute
a crime).
110 Cybercrime: Piercing the Darkness, supra note 109.
'1 Sharon Gaudin, Virus Damage Worst on Record for August, INTERNETNEWS.COM,
Sept. 2, 2003, http://www.intemetnews.com/stats/article.php/3071051.
112 Id.
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has become increasingly common. The Federal Trade Commission estimated
that theft of data caused $50 billion in losses in the United States in 2004. 13
It follows readily from the previous section that direct claims against
hackers should be governed by property rules. A hacker is analogous, in many
cases, to a vandal who spray paints someone's house. Since the hacker intends
to destroy someone's property, he can seek permission before acting - in other
words, transaction costs are low. In addition, since his activity is socially
undesirable at any scale, it should be completely deterred rather than taxed by
14
a liability rule."
The question taken up here, which is a dominant question in the
cybersecurity literature, is whether a third party should be held strictly liable
for the harms caused by hackers and virus creators - sometimes referred to as
indirect liability.' 1 5 The third parties typically mentioned are Internet Service
Providers and operating system sellers. Since they are not the authors of
viruses, property rules should not be, and probably cannot be, applied against
them. I will therefore consider the arguments for liability rules and for
immunity below.
1.

Strict Liability

As noted above, a dominant policy issue in the cybersecurity setting is
whether any third party should be held strictly liable for the harms caused by
hackers and virus creators. There are several third parties who could be
considered candidates for strict liability under an indirect liability theory. One
is the Internet Service Provider. Strict liability for Internet Service Providers
might lead them to monitor the activities of users and thereby identify
hackers. 16 Another candidate is the operating system manufacturer, on the
theory that it could take steps to reduce the damage caused by hackers - say by
fixing a security flaw in the operating system. 117 Alternatively, in the case of a
hacker who gains information from electronic files, the owner of those files
could be held strictly liable.
To determine whether strict liability would be desirable, we should return to
the basic principles developed in the previous section of this Article. 118 Strict
liability differs from negligence in the sense that it affects activity levels. It
forces the liable party to think about how frequently it wishes to engage in the
activity giving rise to liability, or to consider deep design changes that would
113 Hot Data, ECONOMIST, June 25, 2005, at 15.

114See Hylton, supra note 22, at 181-82.
115 Compare, e.g., Lichtman, supra note 16, at 54 (advocating indirect liability for
Internet Service Providers), with Jim Harper, Against ISP Liability, REGULATION, Spring
2005, at 30, 30 (opposing indirect liability for Internet Service Providers).
116 See Lichtman, supra note 16, at 57.
117 See

Todd Bishop, Should Microsoft Be Liable for Bugs?, SEATTLE

INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 12, 2003,
118 See supra Part lI.B.

at Al.
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reduce the frequency of injuries even when the activity is undertaken with
optimal care.
The second basic principle is that strict liability should be applied when
there is a noticeable imbalance between an activity's externalized benefits and
externalized costs. For example, the common law applies strict liability to
blasting because the ratio of externalized costs to externalized benefits is
unusually high, even when the blasting is conducted with optimal care.
A key case illustrating the limits of strict liability is Rickards v. Lothian.119
Recall that an intruder gains access to the lavatory in the defendant's building
and intentionally causes a flood that damages the business property of the
plaintiff tenant. The court held that the defendant was not strictly liable
because the activity of providing a lavatory externalized more benefits than
120
costs to the building's tenants.
The principle illustrated by Rickards is evident in other cases as well.
Consider, for example, the provision of natural gas. The gas is highly
flammable and could cause enormous damage if it were to escape. However,
natural gas companies are not held strictly liable for the harmful escapes
(mostly explosions) that do occur.' 21 The reason is that the provision of gas
22
provides substantial benefits to the communities that receive it. 1
Now let us apply this reasoning to the virus creator. In many respects, the
Internet Service Provider is like the building owner in Rickards. The Internet
Service Provider allows the Internet user to connect to a stream of code which
includes some harmful computer viruses. Or, one could say that the operating
system manufacturer is similar to the building owner in Rickards, while the
Internet Service Provider is similar to the water supply company. The
unknown wrongdoer who stuffs the sink and turns on the water is analogous to
the virus creator or hacker.
This analogy suggests the conclusion that the Internet Service Provider and
operating system manufacturer should not be held strictly liable for the conduct
of the hacker. They have jointly provided an information resource that benefits
the Internet user, just as the provision of water in Rickards benefited the
plaintiff. Moreover, given that the potential harmful resource in the virus case
is information, public goods theory suggests that strict liability would be
inefficient given the external benefits associated with enhanced information
23
dissemination.

119 [1913] A.C. 263 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Austl.).
120 See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
121See, e.g., Mahowald v. Minnesota Gas Co., 344 N.W.2d 856, 862 (Minn. 1984);
Strawbridge v. City of Philadelphia, 2 Pennyp. 419, 422 (Pa. 1882); Foster v. City of
Keyser, 501 S.E.2d 165, 175 (W. Va. 1997).

122 Strawbridge, 2 Pennyp. at 426.
123 See Hylton, supra note 50, at 988; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE
261-62 (1981); see also HOLMES, supra note 68, at 139 (suggesting that the legal standard
for slander favors the defendant because of the benefits of free speech).
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Although my focus to this point has been on viruses and hackers, the
question of whether strict indirect liability is desirable has also arisen in the
context of copyright violations and file sharing over the Internet. The
foregoing argument against strict liability holds true for copyright infringement
claims against developers of peer-to-peer file sharing networks, such as the
claim considered in MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.124 Since peer-to-peer
file sharing networks clearly have socially desirable uses, the developers
should not, as a general policy, be subject to strict indirect liability for

infringement. 125
2.

Negligence

What about the option of liability based on negligence? As a general rule,
the answer to this question is yes - that the negligence standard should apply.
The negligence standard is the default liability rule in tort law. Islands of strict
liability and tort immunity appear to be relatively infrequent exceptions
encountered in a sea of negligence law. However, even on this question we
have to consider the specific form of the negligence charge, including possible
defenses.
Negligence assertions come in three general forms. One is negligence in
operation, a charge that the defendant was negligent in his conduct, e.g., in
operating a car. A second is negligence in design, a charge that the defendant
was negligent in the manner in which he designed some object that played a
role in causing the plaintiffs harm. The third is negligence in informing or
warning, a charge that the defendant was negligent in failing to inform the
plaintiff of a foreseeable injury. In the case of a claim of indirect liability for a
virus, the defendant operating system seller typically has taken no positive
action leading directly to the harm. As a consequence, the type of negligence
charge against the operating system seller usually will be either negligence in
design or negligence in warning. In the case of the Internet Service Provider,
all three types of negligence claim might be available to a plaintiff.
Negligent design and warning claims include, as special cases, most product
liability actions. Product liability lawsuits are often described as strict liability.
However, product liability lawsuits based on defective design or failure to
warn claims are grounded in negligence doctrine rather than strict liability.
The only category of product liability claim in which true strict liability is
observed is that involving manufacturing defects - i.e., glitches in the
manufacturing process that result in one out of every thousand or so products
being defective.

124 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2770 (2005).
125 An

alternative enforcement strategy available to the music industry is individual

lawsuits against music downloaders. For an empirical analysis of the effectiveness of that
strategy, see generally Sudip Bhattacharjee, Ram D. Gopal, Kaveepan Lertwachara & James
R. Marsden, Impact of Legal Threats on Online Music Sharing Activity: An Analysis of
Music Industry Legal Actions, 49 J.L. & ECON. 91 (2006).
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Proximate Cause and Intervention

The negligence in design issue was addressed in Rickards. The plaintiff had
received an award from the trial court on the ground that the defendant could
have used an alternative sink design that would have reduced the likelihood of
harm to the plaintiff. 126 The House of Lords reversed this part of the trial
court's decision, holding that intervention on the part of the unknown
wrongdoer severed the chain of causation between the defendant's negligence
and the plaintiff's harm. 127 In other words, the court held that the defendant's
negligent design was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff's harm given the
1 28
intervention of the sink stuffer.
The intervention holding in Rickards is consistent with the traditional view
courts took at the time. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
courts tended to treat intentional intervention as sufficient to prove lack of
proximate cause (though there were exceptions even then). Modem cases have
begun to take a less rigid approach.1 29 Some jurisdictions, for example, hold
car owners liable for negligently leaving their keys in the car when a thief
130
steals the car and injures a pedestrian.
Courts have yet to articulate a clear principle distinguishing cases in which a
defendant will be held liable for the intentional acts of an intervening party. 131
However, the cases do suggest some factors that make liability more likely.
One such factor is if the plaintiff relied on the defendant to take steps to
prevent the very injury that occurred. For example, in Janofv. Newsom,'132 the
plaintiff-employer relied on an employment agency to conduct reference
checks on all of the potential employees it recommended. 33 The agency
recommended one employee without conducting an investigation, and that
employee robbed the plaintiff.134 The court found the agency liable, observing
that the plaintiff's reliance on the agency was the reason she did not conduct a
reference check herself. 35 The principle suggested by this case is that if a
plaintiff forgoes significant self-protective steps that he ordinarily would have
taken due to reliance on a defendant's efforts, then the intervention of a third
126 Rickards v. Lothian, [1913] A.C. 263, 270-72 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Austl.).
127 Id. at 282.
128 Id. at 273.

129 This progression toward a less rigid approach is suggested by the proximate cause
cases covered in most law casebooks. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 40, at 435-80. One
author predicts the "ultimate victory" of general foreseeability as the criterion to determine
whether proximate cause exists. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
267 (4th ed. 1971).
130 E.g., Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943).

' See PROSSER, supra note 129, at 267-70.
132 53 F.2d 149 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
133 Id. at 150-51.

134 Id. at 151.
135Id. at 152.
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party will not sever the chain of causation between the defendant's negligence
and the plaintiffs injury.
There is another set of cases in which courts have found the defendant liable
despite third party intervention. These are cases in which (1) the defendant's
negligence effectively disabled or left the plaintiff in a position where he could
not take steps to avoid a harm, and (2) the defendant failed to protect the
plaintiff from the harm even though it would have been possible to do so. For
example, in Brauer v. New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co., 136 the
railway defendant negligently collided with the plaintiffs horse-drawn
wagon. 137 The wagon was destroyed, as was the horse, and its contents were
strewn about the street. 138 The plaintiff remained in a state of shock as thieves
came along and ran off with his property. 39 The railway's security agents
stood guard to protect the train as all of this took place. 40 Another case with
the same general characteristics is Hines v. Garrett,14 1 where the defendant
railway negligently passed the plaintiffs stop and let her off almost a mile
away from it, requiring her to walk through an unsettled area. 142 The plaintiff
43
was raped as she tried to walk back to her intended destination.
Janof Brauer, and Hines are all cases decided in the period in which courts
tended to adhere to the traditional view that intervention by a third party breaks
the chain of causation between the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's
injury. They establish clear exceptions to the intervention rule. More modem
cases tend to rely on the general concept of foreseeability, which does not
provide clear doctrinal guidelines.
Returning to the cyberspace problem, how should the intervention of a
hacker be treated? Suppose a plaintiff brings suit against an Internet Service
Provider or operating system seller on the theory that the defendant should
have taken greater precautions to avoid the harm caused by the hacker. Should
the intervention of a hacker be treated as severing the chain of causation
between the defendant's negligence and the plaintiffs injury?
The question of intervention in the cyberspace setting can be approached in
light of the traditional rules or in light of the modem foreseeability approach.
The former approach is much more predictable, since the cases give fairly clear
exceptions to the rule that intervention severs the causal chain. The more
recent cases require a fact-specific inquiry, the outcome of which probably
could not be predicted in the absence of a real case. For this reason, I will
focus on the traditional rules here.
136 103 A. 166 (N.J. 1918).

137 Id. at 167.
138 Id. at 166.
139
140

Id. at 166-67.
Id.

"1 108 S.E. 690 (Va. 1921).

142 Id. at 691.
143 Id.
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The traditional rules suggest that the answer to the question of intervention
depends on the type of negligence that is asserted and proved in court. Janof
suggests that if the plaintiff reasonably relied on the defendant taking some
particular precaution, and for this reason did not take preventative measures of
his own, then the defendant could be held liable even though the injury
resulted from the intervention of a third party. In the cyberspace context, this
means that an Internet user could recover from an Internet Service Provider if
the user relied on the provider for some precaution, decided not to take
precautionary steps himself, and suffered a loss as a result of a computer virus
or hacker.
The raises the question of whether there in fact are instances of such reliance
in the cyberspace setting. Clearly, it is an empirical question and cannot be
answered on the basis of armchair speculation. A real case would have to
present a set of facts that bring this question to life. However, in most run-ofthe-mill cases of virus contamination, Internet users are not relying on a
particular precaution taken by an Internet Service Provider or operating system
seller. If I choose to download a file from the Social Science Research
Network electronic library, a warning appears telling me that it could contain a
virus. After seeing the warning, I choose whether to download the file. In this
scenario, I do not rely on a specific precaution taken by the Internet Service
Provider or operating system seller to avoid exposing individual users to
viruses. Even if no warning were provided, it is now common knowledge that
a file downloaded from a website could contain a virus. Armed with common
knowledge, or informed by the warning, I have no reason to rely on some
special precaution taken by the Internet Service Provider or by the operating
system seller. 144
Again, the answer to the reliance question is in the end an empirical matter.
We might have a different case if I had approached an Internet website to
download a file and reasonably believed, in the absence of a pop-up warning,
that my operating system would not be exposed to a computer virus. Suppose,
for example, that I had been trained into relying on the warning, and one did
not appear when it should have. This design flaw might expose the operating
system seller to liability, though it would be difficult to prove that I reasonably
relied on the warning given the circumstances. Since most computer users
know that a virus can be contracted by downloading a file (and software
licenses waive legal claims for such harms), it would be difficult for a plaintiff
to prove that he reasonably believed it was perfectly safe to download a file
from the Internet.
Another case for holding the defendant liable despite third party intervention
might arise when the defendant's conduct disabled the plaintiff and left him

144 It is also true that most software licenses disclaim any responsibility for harm caused
by third parties, which is another reason that some level of assumption of risk is likely to be
found in this case.
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vulnerable. 45 Suppose, for example, a design flaw in a security patch disables
the operating system's defenses or renders the operating system especially
vulnerable to a particular virus. The user downloads the security patch and his
computer contracts the virus. This might be considered analogous to cases like
Brauer and Hines, where the defendant's negligence put the plaintiff in a
particularly vulnerable position with respect to the intervening wrongdoer.
Now consider the general foreseeability test as a way of determining
whether an Internet Service Provider or operating system seller should be
liable for the harm caused by a hacker or virus creator. Instead of looking at
particular types of negligence in conjunction with reliance or the disabling of
the plaintiff, we should consider any possible fact scenario in which a court
might hold that the defendant should have taken a precaution in order to
prevent a harm caused by an intervening party.
As noted above, the general foreseeability approach is fact-specific and
could easily lead to liability (or not) depending on how courts weigh the costs
and benefits of a particular precaution. Because of the uncertainty surrounding
this approach, the only useful thought exercise that can be conducted at this
stage is to consider the general type of negligence asserted and the likely
defenses.
The most general type of negligence assertion is when an Internet Service
Provider fails to take precautions or an operating system seller fails to correct
some flaw in its software that leaves users vulnerable to the work of a hacker.
Since software design is imperfect, and since hackers search for ways to
exploit security flaws, I assume there are many potential fact scenarios that
could be asserted to support such a negligence claim. Moreover, in each case,
it might appear from a hindsight-based test that the defendant was negligent.
After all, software code is just code. Presumably any competent programmer
could correct a flaw, viewed in isolation, once it has been identified. Since the
cost of correcting a particular flaw would appear to be low (just write some
more code), and the possible harm to the victim potentially high, the plaintiff's
negligence theory would appear to be plausible.
But this analysis of a hypothetical negligence claim is incomplete, for
several reasons. First, measuring the burden of precaution by looking at the
cost of fixing an isolated flaw is probably incorrect on economic grounds.
Second, fixing flaws or preventing hacker attacks requires a level of intrusion
that raises troubling issues on its own. 146 Third, given that the enemy is

145 See,

e.g., Demon in the Machine,

ECONOMIST,

Dec. 3, 2005, at 59 (providing an

example in which "millions of CDs sold by Sony BMG surreptitiously contained a secretive
computer program to prevent copying on a PC - yet left around 500,000 computers
vulnerable to viruses").
146See Harper, supra note 115, at 31 (considering ways in which Internet Service
Providers might protect against viruses and hackers, and warning that some of the options,
such as monitoring users to detect suspicious activity, raise serious privacy concerns).
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difficult to identify and constantly changing its strategy, any precaution taken
must avoid making the problem worse.
The burden of precaution involved in fixing a software flaw probably seems
low to most people on a hindsight-based test. But with a complicated, evolved
software product, such as an operating system, the precaution cost probably
should not be measured in isolation. If there are N functional components in
communication with each other, then a hacker presumably has something like
N! ways to exploit a flaw in one component in order to contaminate or damage
the whole system. After one particular path has been chosen and exploited by
the hacker, the fix seems cheap. But before a particular path has been chosen,
the fix is quite difficult.
In addition to the burden being potentially enormous, the level of intrusion
required to fix a flaw or prevent an attack raises troubling issues. An operating
system seller can make a security patch available, but in the absence of prior
consent cannot install it on its own or force a computer user to install it.
Likewise, an operating system seller or an Internet Service Provider might be
able to identify a hacker. 4 7 But the seller or provider, short of passing
information to government authorities, has no legal authority to prevent the
hacker from accessing the Internet - and even attempting to do so would be
futile, since the hacker could always gain access from an alternative site.
Further, if an operating system seller or Internet Service Provider were
somehow to block Internet access to users meeting a certain profile, even in a
case in which it would lead to an unambiguous improvement in social welfare,
most people would be concerned about the loss of privacy and freedom of
expression this would entail. These concerns further complicate the task of
preventing hacker attacks.
The externalized benefits created by the dissemination of information could
lead one to be wary of imposing a duty on Internet Service Providers or
operating system sellers to prevent hackers from launching attacks. This
concern might seem to suggest that the standards for information torts (e.g.,
defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress) should be used to
determine indirect liability for hacker attacks. However, these standards are
not directly applicable to this case. The liability standard for information torts
is a difficult one for plaintiffs to meet, but that is because it is the defendant's
activity that brings information to the market. In the case of a hacker or virus
147 Of course, one question here is whether a private party will have an incentive to
identify a hacker. Operating system sellers and Internet Service Providers are repeat
players, and therefore should have strong incentives to identify hackers. Private firms that
hold records are not necessarily repeat players, and therefore may not have as strong an
incentive to identify hackers. Resources that record-holding firms invest in identifying
hackers provide benefits to other firms, including rivals. For this reason, record-holding
firms may have inadequate incentives to identify hackers. For an economic analysis of this

issue, see generally Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of the Private and Social
Costs of the Provision of Cybersecurity and Other Public Security Goods, 14 SUP. CT.
ECON. REv. 261 (2006).
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creator, the complaint against the operating system seller or Internet Service
Provider is not related to bringing information to the market. The complaint is
that it should have taken steps to prevent one individual from harming another.
Information market concerns are relevant but not a controlling factor here in
determining the proper liability standard.
An analogous case involves the duty of a psychologist to take steps to
protect a third party who has been named by one of the psychologist's patients
as the target of a planned assault. In Tarasoffv. Regents of the University of
California,148 the court imposed a duty to warn when a patient makes a
credible threat involving a specific targeted individual. 149 Tarasoff remains
controversial because of the concern that a duty to warn would discourage
open dialogue between a patient and his therapist. 150 In this respect, Tarasoff
reflects the information-market concerns observed in the area of informationbased torts such as defamation.
However, courts since Tarasoff have
attempted to strike a balance between information-market concerns and the
goal of minimizing harm by requiring warnings only in instances of specific
151
and credible threats.
The principle of Tarasoff appears to apply to the case of the hacker and the
third parties who could prevent his attacks. Moreover, the principle appears to
apply whether the third party attempts to prevent the hacker from acting or to
warn the potential victim. It may be feasible for an Internet Service Provider
or operating system seller to prevent some hacker attacks by monitoring
Internet activity. However, because of the information-market concerns (e.g.,
loss of privacy, control of expression), this sort of intervention is easier to
defend if the Internet Service Provider has reliable information involving
credible threats against a specific target. Of course, even under these
circumstances, it may be impossible to prevent a hacker from launching an
attack.
Warning the potential victim is an obvious precautionary option that has the
benefit of appearing not to be a futile exercise. But the usefulness of a warning
depends on the circumstances.' 52 If it is infeasible to issue a warning in time to
prevent the attack, then it cannot be considered a useful precautionary step, and
no court should impose a duty to warn under these conditions. In addition, a
warning may backfire by creating the very problem the operating system seller
or Internet Service Provider is trying to avoid. For example, a warning to
potential victims that their operating systems have a specific vulnerability and

148

551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).

149

Id. at 353.

150 See id. at 359 (Clark, J., dissenting).

151See, e.g., Davidson v. City of Westminster, 649 P.2d 894, 900 (Cal. 1982); Thompson
v. County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728, 734 (Cal. 1980).
152 On the economics of cyber-attack warnings, see generally Peter P. Swire, A Modelfor
When Disclosure Helps Security: What Is Different About Computer and Network Security?,
AND ECONOMICS OF CYBERSECURITY, supra note 108, at 29.
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need to be patched may spur a hacker to try to exploit the vulnerability. The
usual procedure in the industry is for a security patch to be developed and
made available to computer users without broadcasting the existence of a
particular vulnerability. 153 However, the presumably rare case in which an
Internet Service Provider or operating system seller obtains information about
a specific attack planned against a specific target would appear to be one in
which a duty to warn would be appropriate, as in Tarasoff Whether the failure
to warn in such a case would be negligent is a different issue, and would
depend on how difficult it would have been to warn and how effective the
warning would likely have been.
C.

Immunity

The information-market concerns lead naturally into a discussion of the
immunity issue exemplified by Blumenthal v. Drudge.'54 Recall that America
Online was held immune to a defamation claim brought by Sidney Blumenthal
because it was protected by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
(CDA). 155 Given that America Online's relationship with Drudge was similar
to that between The New York Times and one of its columnists, 156 the outcome
of Blumenthal is difficult to defend. It is a long-settled matter of law that
publishers are vicariously liable if they knowingly, recklessly, or negligently
publish defamatory statements of the writers whose work they publish,' 57 and
that newspaper publishers in particular are vicariously liable for the
defamatory statements of their writer-employees.
The general issue raised by Blumenthal is the extent to which Internet
Service Providers should be vicariously liable for the content that they make
available to their subscribers. While Blumenthal appears to be a case in which
vicarious liability would have been found in the absence of the protecting
statute,1 58 a more troubling case involves statements posted in online
discussion areas, such as bulletin boards or chat rooms. The CDA certainly
protects Internet Service Providers from liability in those cases as well, but I
am asking whether there is a basis in tort doctrine for this protection.
The immunity question returns us to Rickards v. Lothian. The anonymous
person who posts a false negative comment about your business in an online
bulletin board can be analogized to the unknown sink stuffer in Rickards. The
"I See Ashish Arora, Rahul Telang & Hao Xu, Optimal Policy for Software
Vulnerability Disclosure 2 (2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=669023.
154 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
"I Id. at 52-53; see also Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(c)(2)(B) (2000).
156 See Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 51.
'5' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B (1965).
158 See Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 51 ("If it were writing on a clean slate, this Court
would agree with plaintiffs.").
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Internet Service Provider's general activity, including the provision of the
online bulletin board, is beneficial to society - like the provision of water in
Rickards. The principle reflected in Rickards suggests that Internet Service
Providers should not be vicariously liable for defamatory comments posted in
online discussion areas over which they assert virtually no control. 159 But this
is different from the Blumenthal case, where the Internet Service Provider did
control the content. To reconcile Blumenthal with Rickards, we would have to
change the facts of Rickards so that the defendant (the building lessee) actually
stuffed the sink himself. And if the defendant had stuffed the sink in Rickards,
he would clearly be liable for the damage done to the second-floor tenant.
The CDA was a reaction to the failure of at least one court to draw the
distinction just drawn between appropriate and inappropriate cases for
vicarious liability. 160 The statute itself was an overreaction that has led to a far
broader immunity shield than would be implied by common law tort doctrine.
The last real-world problem to consider is liability for theft of information.
The issues here are in some instances academic since cases of information theft
do not always lead immediately to a substantial and quantifiable harm to the
victim. 161 If someone steals your medical records, what is the harm to you?
Obviously, if someone steals your "medical identity" and uses it to obtain
fraudulent prescriptions, there is a potential harm: you might be required to pay
for the prescriptions, or the identity thief's conduct might prevent you from
obtaining your medicine. But if someone takes your information and never
reveals it to anyone, have you suffered a harm?
Given the imprecise and inchoate nature of the injury to victims, firms that
hold information electronically may take inadequate steps to prevent its
theft.' 62 After all, if the information is stolen, it may take some time for the
victim to realize the nature or existence of a resulting harm.

'59 This principle was initially followed in Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp.
135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). For a more recent case consistent with the principle but decided
on the basis of the CDA, see Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th

Cir. 2003).

160The failure to draw this distinction occurred in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy
Servs. Co., 23 Media L. Rep. 1794, 1797 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995), available at 1995 WL
323710. The House Conference Report on the CDA stated that one of the "specific
purposes" of Section 230 was "to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy." H.R. REP. No.
104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), as reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 208; see also
Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Liability of Internet Service Providerfor Internet or E-Mail
Defamation, 84 A.L.R.5th 169, 178 (2000) (describing Section 230 of the CDA as "a
specific response to Stratton-Oakmont").
161 See generally Thomas M. Lenard & Paul H. Rubin, Much Ado About Notification,
REGULATION,

Spring 2006, at 44 (assessing the costs of identity theft).

162As Bruce Kobayashi suggests, firms that store information are likely to have

inadequate incentives to identify hackers. See supra note 147. In addition to this problem,
if the harm to victims is difficult to predict and unlikely to appear for years, firms may
choose to ignore the risk of liability for data security breaches.
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Despite the imprecise and inchoate nature of the injury, tort law should be
sufficient to regulate the incentives of data holders.163 Cases of information
theft would appear to be ideal for class actions. They involve small losses
spread across large numbers of victims. There is nothing to prevent courts
from estimating the potential losses to victims and forcing the negligent data
holder to set up a fund to compensate those losses. 164 Where the information
holder has been negligent, the penalty generated by class action litigants
should be large enough to deter future negligence.
Moreover, this is
theoretically superior on deterrence grounds to a scheme involving statutory
penalties, because the damage judgments awarded in class actions will have a
closer fit to the actual harm suffered by victims than would statutorily set
penalties.
Another approach, potentially superior to class actions seeking
compensatory damages, would be restitution-based claims against corporations
that failed to protect personal information. If, for example, a corporation
165
profits by permitting the personal information of customers to be stolen,
plaintiffs should be able to bring a claim for disgorgement of the corporation's
gains from the theft. In addition, if the corporation's conduct can be
characterized as intentional, a punitive award should be added to the
restitution-based judgment. Specifically, the punitive award should be a
multiple of the disgorgement remedy, with the multiple set in order to offset
the prospect that the defendant might have escaped liability because of the low
166
probability of detection.

An alternative to tort law is to permit the reputation market to pressure firms to
protect personal data. In order for the reputation market to work, data breaches would have
to be disclosed in a way that signaled the importance of the breach. See Paul M. Schwartz
163

& Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105 MIcH. L. REV.

(forthcoming Mar. 2007) (manuscript at 34-36), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=-908709.
164 Obviously, the courts must be vigilant against fraud. Losses should be estimated by
competent analysts and supported by credible evidence. The widespread fraud observed
recently in the silicosis litigation should not be permitted to occur in this area. On the
silicosis fraud, see Wade Goodwyn, Silicosis Ruling Could Revamp Legal Landscape, NPR,

Mar. 6, 2006, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5244935.
165 Suppose, for example, a retailer encourages customers to apply for gift cards, and an
identity thief applies for several thousand dollars worth of gift cards using stolen financial
information. The identify thief then spends the gift cards quickly. If the store's security
system is so weak that these events occur frequently, a plaintiff's lawyer could take the
frequency of occurrence as evidence that the retailer either recklessly or intentionally
permitted identity theft to occur. For a journalistic account of various identity theft scams
and recent case law, see generally Jason Krause, Stolen Lives, A.B.A. J., Mar. 2006, at 36.
166 Hylton, supra note 102, at 439-44 (setting out an algorithm for punitive awards).
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CONCLUSION

This Article has applied the theory of property rules and liability rules to
cyberspace torts. That theory suggests that trespass doctrine is appropriate in
instances of cyber-invasions of private information resources, such as the
breaking of codes to access private information on the Web. However,
trespass doctrine should play no role in instances of cyber-invasions of public
information resources, such as the sending of unwanted emails in Hamidi or
the information gathering in eBay. Cyber-invasions of public information
resources can be analogized either to nuisance or to negligence cases.
Nuisance doctrine appears on both theoretical and practical grounds to provide
the best fit.
Another set of cases that might lead to liability are those in which plaintiffs
assert indirect liability claims against operating system sellers or Internet
Service Providers for the harms caused by certain actors (e.g., virus writers,
copyright violators). The theory presented here suggests that the basis for
strict indirect liability is weak. Negligence principles apply here, as elsewhere,
though special attention should be given to proximate causation issues and the
peculiar burdens of preventing virus attacks. Finally, the theory suggests that
immunity rules should also play a role in this area, though in a much smaller
set of instances than those protected by the Communications Decency Act.
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